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Abstract
Do media frame attacks with Muslim perpetrators as “terrorism” and attacks with White
perpetrators as the result of “mental illness”? Despite public speculation and limited
academic work with relatively small subsets of cases, there have been no systematic
analyses of potential biases in how media frame terrorism. We addressed this gap by
examining the text of print news coverage of all terrorist attacks in the United States
between 2006 and 2015. Controlling for fatalities, affiliation with a group, and existing
mental illness, the odds that an article references terrorism are approximately five times
greater for a Muslim versus a non-Muslim perpetrator. In contrast, the odds that an
article references mental illness do not significantly differ between White and non-White
perpetrators. Results partially confirm public speculation and are robust against
numerous alternative explanations. Differences in media framing can influence public
(mis)perceptions of violence and threats, and ultimately harm counterterrorism policy.
Keywords
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In the aftermath of extremist violence, public discussion often centers on the question of
whether or not to call the incident terrorism. This question can be deceptive in its
simplicity; there is no absolute definition of terrorism for journalists to reference, nor are
they obligated to select and consistently apply a specific definition. Recent public
speculation suggests that media reference terrorism in coverage of terror attacks by
non-White (often Muslim) perpetrators, whereas White perpetrators are more likely to be
portrayed as mentally ill. A look at individual cases provides some anecdotal support for
this supposition. For example, following Dylann Roof’s 2015 attack in Charleston,
debate emerged over whether it was appropriate to call Roof a terrorist, and coverage
often speculated about potential mental illness (e.g., Bump, 2015). More recently, many
argued that the 2017 Las Vegas shooting should be called terrorism, surmising that
media would have done so if the perpetrator had been Muslim (e.g., Vedantam, 2017).

Yet, the idea that media differentially reference these terms is speculative.1 To date,
there has been no systematic analysis of differences in how media apply terms that
heighten the salience of terrorism or mental illness in coverage of terror attacks.
In systematic work focused on the quantity of news coverage on terror attacks,
evidence shows that Muslim-perpetrated attacks receive more media attention than
attacks by non-Muslims (Kearns et al., 2019b; Mitnik et al., 2020). What we do not yet
know is how the content of this coverage may systematically differ as a function of the
perpetrator’s identity. To date, research on qualitative differences in U.S. media
coverage of terrorism has focused on a few specific events rather than the universe of
cases. Looking at a subset of 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., Powell (2011) found that
news coverage of Muslim perpetrators often assumed a religious motivation and
connections to a larger group, whereas non-Muslim perpetrators were more likely to be
described as mentally unstable. Analyzing the 15 most covered attacks in the New York
Times, Mitnik et al. (2020) found that coverage of Muslim perpetrators focused on
external radicalization and otherness while personal histories and mental health issues
were used to explain the actions of non-Muslim perpetrators. Comparing coverage of
Dylann Roof and Omar Mateen, Arva et al. (2017) found that coverage of Roof focused
more on mental health while coverage of Mateen more often discussed terrorism. In
depictions of mass violence more broadly, U.S. media also tend to portray White
perpetrators more sympathetically than non-White perpetrators (Gade et al., 2018).
While these findings suggest bias in media coverage, it is also possible that results are
a function of the cases selected for comparison. Without a systematic analysis of all
U.S. terrorism cases over a set time period and their coverage, we cannot know
whether there are meaningful differences in how media frame terrorist attacks, and how
this is influenced by perpetrator identity. The present study addresses this gap by
examining the following research question: In media coverage of terror attacks, when is
terrorism referenced and when is mental illness referenced?
In the present study, we examined the text of print media coverage of every terrorist
attack in the United States between 2006 and 2015 as coded by the Global Terrorism
Database (GTD), where terrorism is defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal
force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social
goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” While scholars debate nuances in the
definition of terrorism—such as whether state actors can perpetrate it or whether civilian
targets are required (see Schmid, 2011), quantitative research in this area
predominantly uses the GTD definition and data (Young, 2019). The GTD has
systematically collected event-level data since 1970 and is the most comprehensive
publicly available terrorism dataset. Importantly, GTD data collection and coding is done
independently by a research team following the publicly available codebook and does
not represent specific interests or perspectives of any funding body.2 In tying our

sampling frame to a public terrorism database, we addressed the limitation in prior work
by studying media coverage of all attacks in the U.S. rather than subsets of cases which
may bias results of those studies. Further, since we analyze only attacks coded as
terrorism, these should all be framed as terrorism in media coverage and deviation from
this may suggest bias in coverage.
We focused on two inquiries: First, we compared references to terrorism in coverage
of attacks with Muslim versus non-Muslim perpetrators. Second, we compared
references to mental illness in coverage of attacks with White versus non-White
perpetrators. It was necessary to separate these questions since the colloquially
popular logic that “Muslims perpetrators are terrorists and White perpetrators are
mentally ill” implies two false dichotomies: (1) that perpetrators are either Muslim or
White and (2) that media coverage will reference either terrorism or mental illness. In
reality, however, perpetrators of terrorism may be White, Muslim, both, or neither.
Similarly, media coverage of attacks may reference terrorism, mental illness, both, or
neither. Further, some perpetrators of terrorism do have mental health issues while
others do not.
Media Framing
Media establish what the public needs to know and highlight the most relevant and
salient dimensions of how information should be understood and discussed (Gerbner,
1998; McCombs, 2014; Scheuefele & Tewksbury, 2007). Framing—the process of
defining an object by heightening the salience of selected aspects of it—influences how
people perceive and structure the object and its place in the world (McCombs,
2014; Powell, 2011). As framed aspects of something become more salient, unframed
aspects become less salient (Entman, 1993; McCombs, 2014). While frames are
employed in everyday communication, media framing is especially powerful in
influencing public discussions of issues, events, and people (Bekkers et al., 2011).
Frames help us construct mental models of the world and encourage us to understand it
in certain ways (Price et al., 1997).
While there are many ways to frame objects, here we focus on emphasis frames and
associative frames. Emphasis frames draw attention to information that the audience is
meant to view as deserving special consideration (Druckman, 2001). For example,
referring to an attack as a “terror attack” v. “shooting” v. “crazed rampage” emphasize
different aspects of the incident which can alter audience interpretations. Associative
frames highlight the connections between things (which can be done via emphasis
framing), thereby encouraging the audience to judge an issue by those connections
(Van Atteveldt et al., 2005). For example, if the news says that a terrorism task force is

investigating a perpetrator, it invites the audience to think of that person in association
with terrorism without directly accusing them of being a terrorist.
Media select topics to frame with a bias towards attention-grabbing events (Price &
Tewksbury, 1997). Further, when media frame an object, audiences are likely to
activate that frame when presented with similar objects in the future (Price &
Tewksbury, 1997). Exposure to frames in the news also encourages people to search
for more information that fits within those frames and makes people less likely to accept
competing frames (Druckman et al., 2012). Thus, it is important to examine how media
distributes references to terrorism or mental illness. If media are differentially framing
perpetrators based on identity, it could lead audiences to inaccurately associate
terrorism or mental illness with particular demographics.
Global events are often translated into local cultures through media framing, which
itself is colored by the dominant values and power structures of the cultural context in
which it is presented (Altheide, 1987; McCombs, 2014; Nagar, 2010). News framing is
an accumulative process through which ideologies are frequently and repetitively
reinforced (Bryant & Mirion, 2004) and, when frames are repeated, the effects of those
frames are stronger than an individual exposure (Lecheler et al., 2015). Through this,
dominant ideologies and perspectives come to be viewed as “common sense” even
though they are simply possible interpretations of a complex world (Gitlin, 1978).
Media Depictions of Terrorism and Its Perpetrators
Looking at coverage of crime broadly, there is ample evidence that media reporting
tends to represent minority members more negatively than White individuals (Dixon,
2017; Dixon & Linz, 2000). Turning to terrorism specifically, research shows that both
print and television news provide disproportionately more coverage to attacks
perpetrated by Muslims (Dixon & Williams, 2015; Kearns et al., 2019b; Mitnik et al.,
2020). However, this does not tell us how the attacks are being framed, and whether
there are differences in qualitative aspects of the coverage. Three studies examining a
total of 28 terror incidents in the U.S. all found that Muslim-perpetrated attacks were
more likely to be framed as terrorism (Arva et al., 2017; Mitnik et al., 2020; Powell,
2011). Yet, these studies raise the question of bias towards newsworthiness. Findings
may be an artifact of case selection rather than a broader trend in how media frame all
terrorist attacks in the U.S. To determine whether these trends truly exist, a systematic
study of news coverage for all terrorist attacks in the U.S. over a long period of time is
necessary.
Even in news that does not cover terrorism, Muslims are described in more negative
tones generally and are more likely to be linked to extremism than other groups
(Alsultany, 2012; Dixon & Williams, 2015; Prince, 2009; Shaheen, 2014). Western

media also disproportionately frame violence perpetrated by Muslims as terrorism
(Nagar, 2010). Even neutral or sympathetic depictions of Muslims often appear in the
context of ‘bad’ news. Both entertainment and news media have a long history of
framing Muslims as terrorists and terrorism as a Muslim problem (Alsultany,
2012; Shaheen, 2014). Simultaneously drawing attention to group differences and
linking threatening characteristics to an out-group serves to bolster a sense of in-group
identity (Greenaway & Cruwys, 2019). Recall that frames tend to activate when people
are presented with information similar to the original frame. If we combine this with the
disproportionate coverage of Islamist terrorists and negative coverage of Muslims in
general, we are left in a situation where people may come to primarily or
overwhelmingly associate terrorism with Islam. Consistent with Slater’s reinforcing
spirals model (2007, 2015), we note that media have the potential to both shape and
also reflect public sentiment about Muslims, as well as public perceptions of
terrorism.3 As noted below, efforts to establish causality in terms of how violent attacks
are categorized on the basis of perpetrator identity have added to our understanding of
this relationship.
Turning to experimental research with samples from the U.S. public, we see similar
trends in how people view violence. Huff and Kertzer (2018) find that people were more
likely to classify a hypothetical attack as terrorism if the perpetrator was Muslim, though
the effect was relatively small. West and Lloyd (2017)’s findings also support this,
while D’Orazio and Salehyan (2018) found that people are more likely to call an attack
terrorism if the perpetrator was Arab-American—a group often conflated with Muslims.
From this, we expected that:
H1a: Media coverage of a terrorist attack will be more likely to
reference terrorism when the perpetrator is Muslim versus non-Muslim.
As Corner and Gill (2015) note, terrorism research has swung from blaming terrorism
on mental illness to asserting that mental illness precludes terrorist intent because of
reduced agency. Yet, a wide body of literature shows that mental health issues are not
a driver of violence (e.g., Appelbaum & Swanson, 2010). While mental illness has not
been found to motivate terrorist violence, stress and trauma accrued through terrorist
activity may contribute to developing mental illness (Weatherston & Moran, 2003).
Relative to the general population, lone actor terrorists have higher rates of mental
illness while groups actors have lower rates—but, regardless, perpetrators with mental
illnesses are still the minority (Gruenewald et al., 2013).
Despite the lack of data linking terrorism and mental illness, experimental evidence
with samples of the U.S. public shows that partisan motivated reasoning influences
whether people will attribute an attack to group identity or mental illness. People are

more likely to rate violent in-group actors as being mentally ill and violent out-group
actors as motivated by identity (Noor et al., 2018). When comparing perceptions of Arab
Muslim versus White supremacist terrorists, Americans are far less likely to refer to the
latter as terrorists or assume an ideological motivation, and tend to assume that they
are mentally ill (D’Orazio & Salehyan, 2018). People are also less likely to call an attack
terrorism if the perpetrator was mentally ill (Huff & Kertzer, 2018). All of this implies that
people are simply less likely to view White perpetrators as terrorists and more willing to
find alternate explanations for their behavior, while Muslim perpetrators are not granted
the same consideration. Further, people are more likely to reference mental illness to
explain an attack in cases where the perpetrator is also a member of the respondent’s
in-group, thereby creating distance between the perpetrator’s actions and what is
normative among the broader group (Noor et al., 2018). From this we expected:
H1b: Media coverage of a terrorist attack will be more likely to reference mental
illness when the perpetrator is White.
Beyond race or religion, other perpetrator-level factors may also influence how
media frame an attack. Some attacks are carried out by members or supporters of a
terrorist group whereas others are perpetrated by individuals or groups unaffiliated with
a larger organization. Huff and Kertzer (2018) found that, relative to a lone individual,
Americans were more likely to label an attack as terrorism if the perpetrators were part
of an organization. Reasonably, group affiliation should also influence how media frame
an attack since a discrete group can provide a point of reference for how to view the
attacker’s actions. From this, we expected that:
H2a: Media coverage of a terrorist attack will be more likely to
reference terrorism when it is associated with a known terrorist group.
H2b: Media coverage of a terrorist attack will be less likely to reference mental
illness when it is associated with a known terrorist group.
Some terrorism perpetrators do suffer from mental health issues (Gruenewald et al.,
2013). In these cases, media reporting on mental illness—while potentially
stigmatizing—would not be unreasonable or necessarily an indicator of bias. Media do
not strictly reference mental illness when there is evidence of a valid diagnosis or
reasonable proof that it acted as a motivator though. Media may prime readers to view
the perpetrator as mentally ill by using certain non-clinical terms (e.g., crazy, nuts,
maniac), drawing attention to mental health evaluations, bringing up family histories of
mental illness, or quoting laymen who assume the perpetrator to be mentally ill (e.g.,
“Someone must be crazy to do something like this.”). Relatedly, members of the public

are less likely to consider perpetrators to be terrorists when they have documented
mental health issues (Huff & Kertzer, 2018). From this, we expect that:
H3a: Media coverage of a terrorist attack will be less likely to
reference terrorism when the perpetrator has a mental illness.
H3b: Media coverage of a terrorist attack will be more likely to reference mental
illness when the perpetrator has a mental illness.
The Effects of Casualties on Coverage
Terrorist attacks with more casualties tend to receive more media coverage (Chermak &
Gruenewald, 2006; Kearns et al., 2019b; Mitnik et al., 2020). As fatalities rise, members
of the U.S. public are also more likely to classify an attack as terrorism (Huff & Kertzer,
2018), but casualties are not necessary for an attack to be considered terrorism. In fact,
the modal number of fatalities per terrorist attack is zero (GTD, 2018). Drawing from
Terror Management Theory, a greater number of casualties may evoke a heightened
sense of mortality salience in journalists and thus influence the way that they frame an
attack (Solomon et al., 2015). Further, the number of people killed in an attack
influences whether Americans perceive it as terrorism (Dolliver & Kearns, 2019). The
number of fatalities may influence whether media reference terrorism in coverage of an
attack, but there is no clear theoretical expectation for how casualties would influence
attribution to mental illness. From this, we expect that:
H4: Media coverage of a terrorist attack will be more likely to
reference terrorism as the number of fatalities increases.
Potential Alternate Explanations for Referencing Terrorism
Based on prior research, we expect that other contextual factors may influence how
media frame terror attacks. We identified five alternate explanations that may also
impact whether an attack is linked to terrorism. First, research has shown that people
are more likely to view a bombing as terrorism (Huff & Kertzer, 2018). Second, people
are more likely to call an attack terrorism when there are multiple perpetrators (Huff &
Kertzer, 2018). Third, media coverage of crime is framed less negatively when the
victims are minorities (Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000) and the same may be true for terrorism
specifically. Fourth, while attacks against the government receive more media attention
(Kearns et al., 2019b; Zhang et al., 2013), there is conflicting evidence on whether
targeting the state influences how the public labels an attack (Huff & Kertzer, 2018).
Fifth, some violent incidents clearly meet the GTD definition of terrorism while others do
not meet the threshold for a definitive classification. If experts are not certain that an
attack was terrorism, media may also be more hesitant to use the term.

Potential Alternate Explanations for Referencing Mental Illness
In addition to the alternate explanations above, we also identified four alternate
explanations which could influence when media will reference mental illness in
coverage of a terror attack. First, the number of people killed in an attack may have a
positive relationship with references to mental illness. Second, the existence of multiple
perpetrators may indicate more coordination, thus making the presence of mental
illness seem less likely. Third, it is common for individual perpetrator(s) of terrorism to
be unidentified (Kearns, 2019). When the individual perpetrator(s) are unknown, media
are less able to defensibly speculate about potential mental illness. Fourth, violent
incidents that do not clearly meet the GTD definition of terrorism may be more open to
speculation about the causes, which creates more room to discuss mental illness as a
potentially relevant factor.

Methods
Data
Data for this project focused on terrorist attacks listed in the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) which occurred in the United States from 2006 to 2015.4 During this ten-year
span, the GTD lists 170 terrorist attacks—though under GTD coding an attack at
multiple locations (i.e., the Boston Bombing) has a separate entry for each location.
Since attacks like these were perpetrated by the same individual(s) and are reported on
together in media, we collapsed attacks by the same perpetrator(s) into a single attack
to avoid over-counting and duplicating articles. This yielded a total of 136 terrorism
attacks in the United States between 2006 and 2010.
Media coverage of these attacks focused on two sources: LexisNexis Academic
and CNN.com. LexisNexis Academic searches the full text of thousands of news outlets
from major publications like The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal to local
newspapers from around the country and is commonly used in academic studies of print
news coverage (e.g., Linnemann, 2010). To supplement this coverage, we searched
CNN.com’s archives. Ideally, we would have also searched from online new sources
across the political spectrum. Unfortunately, neither Fox News nor Huffington Post have
a searchable public archive dating back to 2006 and we were unable to secure access
to their bodies of work during this time. Given the large number of news sources
LexisNexis draws from, it is not possible to compare differences in coverage across
sources or control for sources in our analyses. Our interest is in the words used in the
articles; the use of visuals is a separate inquiry outside of the scope of this paper.5
Procedure

We limited coverage to print and online newspaper articles6 from US-based sources
between the date of each attack and the end of 2016 by which point all known
perpetrators had pled guilty, were found not competent to stand trial, or had gone to
trial. We searched the following for each incident: perpetrator(s), location, and key
words about the attack. Our initial goal was over-inclusion of articles to ensure that we
were not missing coverage. Two authors separately reviewed each article to ensure that
we only included articles where the primary focus was the attack, perpetrator(s), or
victim(s). The types of articles we removed most frequently included lists of attacks,
articles focused on a political or policy position where the incident was an anecdote, and
memorials held in other locations. Our dataset was comprised of 3,541 news articles.
Importantly, 36 of the 136 terrorism attacks in our dataset did not receive any coverage
from the sources that we searched. Thus, these cases were excluded from analyses,
leaving us with 100 attacks.7 See Supplemental Appendix A for a list of attacks and the
number of articles covering each.
Variables
We were interested in two outcome variables: (1) whether or not an article
references terrorism8 and (2) whether or not an article references mental illness. For
these dependent variables, each article was coded as 1 = yes if the topic was
referenced at least once and 0 = no if it was not. A small subset of articles referenced
both terrorism and mental illness (6.7%; n = 238). This included title, body, and—where
applicable—graphic captions and highlights.9
To determine whether and how often terrorism and mental illness were referenced,
one author and a hired research assistant separately searched the entire dataset of
3,541 articles in Nvivo for key words associated with our two dependent variables
(see Supplemental Appendix B for search terms). Throughout this process, there was
no subjectivity in coding (keywords appear in the article or they do not) and
discrepancies arose from either Nvivo coding comment sections and URLs or the
software failing to recognize terms with added punctuation marks or typos. In the coding
process, every article was examined three times to ensure that all machine errors were
caught and corrected, including instances of codable terms that were overlooked due to
typos or formatting errors in the article.10 We compared the two separately coded
datasets—over 200,000 data points in total—for discrepancies. After initial coding,
Krippendorff’s alpha was above the common threshold of 0.8 for both references
to terrorism (α = 0.88) and mental illness (α = 0.83) across all articles (Krippendorff,
2004). Finally, two of the authors reviewed all discrepancies and discussed each one
individually until final codes were determined for all data points. In sum, the entire
dataset was double-coded and all coding discrepancies were resolved by the authors.

Our key predictor variables focused on the perpetrator(s) and the number of
casualties. The GTD codes the group responsible for the attack (if applicable), a list of
the known perpetrators, and the number of fatalities. From this, we created a binary
indicator for membership in a known group. Fatalities were measured as the total
number of people—excluding perpetrator(s)—killed in the attack. Prior to coding the
articles, two of the authors separately coded three binary perpetrator-level variables not
included in the GTD: whether the perpetrator was White; whether the perpetrator was
Muslim; and whether the perpetrator was mentally ill. If an attack had multiple
perpetrators and at least one met the criteria, we coded these variables as 1. If the
perpetrator was unknown, these variables were coded as 0. After initial coding,
Krippendorff’s alpha was above the common threshold of 0.8 for these three variables:
perpetrator Muslim (α = 0.93); perpetrator White (α = 0.91); and perpetrator had a known
mental illness11 (α = 0.90; Krippendorff, 2004).12 For additional confidence in the
accuracy of our incident-level coding, all inconsistencies were discussed and final
coding was agreed upon prior to analyses.
We also tested our argument against several alternate explanations. Derived from
the GTD’s weapon type variable, we created a binary indicator for whether or not the
attack involved a bomb, explosive, or dynamite. Since the GTD lists the names of
known perpetrators, we created a binary indicator for attacks with multiple perpetrators.
The individual person(s) who perpetrated each attack was unknown in 24.0% of the
attacks in this dataset, which is common in terrorism (Kearns, 2019). Consequently, we
created a binary variable indicating whether the perpetrator was unknown. The GTD
also includes a variable that identifies cases where there is doubt about whether the
incident clearly meets all definitional criteria of terrorism. Our final two alternative
explanations involved the target as either: 1) law enforcement or government; or, 2) a
minority group. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for each variable.

Results
Since the two key dependent variables are binary—whether or not the article references
(1) terrorism or (2) mental health—we estimated a series of logistic regression models
with standard errors clustered on the attack. To ease interpretation, we present odds
ratios where ratios greater than one indicate a positive relationship and ratios less than
one indicate a negative relationship.13
Table 2 contains the results of models examining whether an article references
terrorism. Supporting H1a, articles are significantly more likely to reference terrorism
when the perpetrator is Muslim (Model 1). When controlling for our other key predictor
variables, the odds an article references terrorism are approximately five times greater if
the perpetrator is Muslim (Model 2). Supporting H2a, we see approximately a two and a

quarter times increase in odds that an article references terrorism when the attack is
perpetrated by a group. When we coded diagnosed mental illness strictly (Model 2), we
did not see support for H3a. However, when we coded mental illness more loosely
(Model 3), the odds that an article references terrorism decrease by approximately half.
Contrary to H4, fatalities were not positively related to the odds of terrorism being
referenced.
We suggested five alternative explanations for when media refer to an attack as
terrorism. Models 4 and 5 in Table 2 tested the first four alternatives: the weapon was
an explosive, there were multiple perpetrators, the target was a minority, and the target
was law enforcement or government. None of these factors impacted the likelihood that
an article references terrorism. Further, controlling for these factors did not change our
main findings that articles about attacks perpetrated by Muslims and those connected to
a group are more likely to reference terrorism. To test our final alternate explanation, we
replicated our analyses from Table 2 but excluded articles about attacks that did not
meet all inclusion criteria to be considered terrorism in the GTD. As shown
in Supplemental Appendix A (Table A3), our results held and the magnitude of each
significant variable remained similar. In sum, the two largest drivers of whether or not an
article referenced terrorism were: whether the perpetrator was Muslim and whether the
perpetrator was part of a terrorist group.
We next examined when media will reference mental illness in coverage of an
attack, as shown in Table 3. Contrary to expectation in H1b, articles about attacks
perpetrated by White people were not more likely to reference mental illness across all
of our models. Supporting H2b, the odds that an article references mental illness
decreased between 69% and 82% if the perpetrator(s) had a group affiliation (Models
7–14). Supporting H3b, the odds that an article references mental illness are between
approximately one to two and a half times greater when the perpetrator actually had a
diagnosed mental health issue at the time of reporting (Models 7–14).
We suggested four possible alternate explanations for when media would reference
mental illness. Models 7 through 14 in Table 3 tested the first three of these
alternatives: more fatalities, multiple perpetrators, and unknown perpetrators. When
mental illness was coded strictly, the odds that an article references mental illness
increased 7% per fatality. Across models, the odds that an article referenced mental
illness decreased 62%–74% if the attack had multiple perpetrators. When the
perpetrator(s) were unknown, the odds that an article references mental illness
decrease 96%–98%. Across these models, our main findings remained significantly and
substantively unchanged. To test our final alternative argument, we replicated the
models from Supplemental Table A4 but only included cases which meet all inclusion

criteria to be considered terrorism in the GTD. As shown in Supplemental Appendix
A (Table A4), our findings were robust and remain substantively unchanged.

Discussion
The motivation for this study was to systematically examine when terrorism is
referenced and when mental illness is referenced in media coverage of terror attacks,
and whether there is variation on the basis of perpetrator identity. Prior research on
media coverage of terrorism has either systematically focused on the amount of
coverage that attacks receive (Kearns et al., 2019b; Mitnik et al., 2020) or examined
differences in how media frame a small subsets of attacks (Arva et al., 2017; Gade et
al., 2018; Mitnik et al., 2020; Powell, 2011). To our knowledge, this is the first paper to
examine how media frame all terrorist attacks in a country during a set time period. By
conducting a systematic examination of content on this scale, we are confident that our
results accurately depict variance (or not) in how media frame attacks on the bases of
perpetrator identity and other factors.
Descriptive statistics showed that less than 40% of the articles in our sample
referenced terrorism, despite all attacks being included in the GTD. In contrast, the
percentage of stories that referenced mental illness is roughly proportional to the
percentage of perpetrators with a known history of mental illness. Because there is no
one definition of terrorism, journalists may be discouraged from referencing it, whereas
the presence of a mental health diagnosis makes referencing the perpetrator’s mental
health more defensible. Yet, that still would not explain differences that emerge in
coverage along demographic lines. Many publicly speculate that media is more likely to
call Muslims terrorists and White people mentally ill, but we only found support for the
former.
Coverage of attacks perpetrated by Muslims were dramatically more likely to
reference terrorism, which may reflect dominant values and power structures whereby
media focus more on threatening characteristics of an out-group in society (Greenaway
& Cruwys, 2019). Results from our systematic examination of all terrorist attacks in the
US from 2006 to 2015 confirmed the results of studies using smaller subsets of terrorist
violence (Arva et al., 2017; Gade et al., 2018; Mitnik, et al. 2020; Powell, 2011). This
finding is also consistent with prior work showing that Muslim-perpetrated attacks
receive more news coverage (Dixon & Williams, 2015; Kearns et al., 2019b; Mitnik et
al., 2020) and that entertainment media tend to depict Muslims and Arabs as terrorists
or villains (Shaheen, 2014). Together, these findings may help explain why people are
more likely to call an attack terrorism if the perpetrator is Muslim or Arab (D’Orazio &
Salehyan, 2018; Huff & Kertzer, 2018; West & Lloyd, 2017). The association between
terrorism and Muslims in news media can help explain the implicit associations that

many in the public have between the two (Saleem & Anderson, 2013). Articles covering
attacks by individuals affiliated with or inspired by a known group that uses terrorism
were also more likely to reference terrorism. This result is consistent with the previous
finding that members of the public are more likely to label an attack to be terrorism
when the perpetrators are part of an organization (Huff & Kertzer, 2018).
We found partial support for the expectation that media would be less likely to
reference terrorism if the perpetrator had a known mental health issue. Whether the
perpetrator had a confirmed mental health issue was unrelated to whether coverage
referenced terrorism. When the mental health status of a perpetrator was known, it may
have been the case that it neither bolstered nor detracted from the attack being
discussed as terrorism. Yet, articles were less likely to reference terrorism when the
perpetrator had a confirmed or suspected mental health issue. We posit that, as long as
the question of the perpetrator’s mental health is in play, there may be a reluctance to
frame an act as terrorism. The discrepancy in findings here is interesting, in that less,
rather than more, certainty about the perpetrator’s mental health decreased the
likelihood of refencing terrorism.
Finally, while casualties have a positive relationship with both the amount of
coverage that attacks receive (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006; Kearns et al.,
2019b; Mitnik et al., 2020) and the likelihood that members of the public will call an
attack terrorism (Huff & Kertzer, 2018), it had no impact on whether coverage
referenced terrorism. While this is a bit surprising, terrorism does not require that
anyone be harmed (GTD, 2018). If media are willing to reference terrorism when
discussing attacks with no or few fatalities, this can help bring public perception of
terrorism more in line with reality. This may decrease fear of terrorism, as people often
vastly overestimate the lethality of terror attack in the US (Kearns et al., 2019a), and
thus undercut terrorism’s effectiveness.
Across all models, the alternate explanations regarding whether coverage of an
attack references terrorism were not supported and our main findings remained
unchanged. While the public is more likely to call an attack terrorism if it involves a
bomb or multiple perpetrators (Huff & Kertzer, 2018), neither factor influenced whether
coverage references terrorism. The target also did not influence whether coverage of an
attack references terrorism. Our results held across both all cases and only cases that
meet all inclusion criteria to be considered terrorism by the GTD.
Turning to factors that influence whether media reference mental illness, we found
no evidence that media are more likely to reference mental illness when the perpetrator
is White. This finding runs counter to public speculation and experimental findings (Noor
et al., 2018), but was robust across all of our models. We posit that, in the relative
absence of references to terrorism, references to mental illness may simply be more
memorable to the reader. References to mental illness may also be more consistent

with expectations about violent individuals. Empirical testing is needed before this
assertion can be presented defensibly, however. While perpetrator race did not impact
media references to mental illness, media coverage was more likely to reference mental
illness if the perpetrator had a known or suspected mental health issue. There were no
differences in known or suspected mental illness between White and non-White or
Muslim and non-Muslim perpetrators. Attacks with multiple perpetrators or in
association with a known group signal greater planning and preparation, which can
explain why coverage of these attacks was less likely to reference mental illness. In the
broader terrorism and violence literatures, people with mental illness are perceived to
not be “good team players” (Corner & Gill, 2015). Attacks with unknown perpetrators
were far less likely to reference mental illness, probably due to a lack of information.
There is some evidence that coverage is more likely to reference mental illness as the
number of fatalities increases, which—while inaccurate—may be an attempt to make
sense of violence by assuming that someone would have to have a mental illness to kill
others. Once again, our results held across coverage of all attacks and just those that
clearly met all inclusion criteria for the GTD.
In sum, our results show the strength of our main findings: Coverage of Muslimperpetrated attacks was more likely to reference terrorism, while there was no
difference in references to mental illness between attacks perpetrated by White people
compared to people of color. These results are robust against a number of alternate
explanations. This strengthened our confidence in the findings that Muslim perpetrators
are more likely to be associated with terrorism while there are no differences in
references to mental illness between White and non-White terrorists.

Conclusion
Limitations and Future Directions
Our results clearly show that incident- and perpetrator-level factors of a terrorist attack
influence whether media coverage references terrorism or mental illness. Media
coverage of terrorism influences how the public understands violence and its
perpetrators, as well as which policies the public will support to address the problem.
Though our findings are robust against a number of alternatives, they still have
limitations. We limited our study to textual analysis of U.S.-based print media coverage
of U.S. terrorist attacks in a 10-year period. While there are both practical and
methodological reasons for this, it is unclear if our findings apply across other contexts
or whether the inclusion of image and photo analysis might yield different or more
nuanced results. Specifically, broadcast news has time constraints and tends to
sensationalize stories (Dixon & Williams, 2015) which may amplify disparities in
coverage. Doing a similar analysis on broadcast news is one potential avenue for future

research. Systematically examining imagery used in media coverage of terrorism is
another potential direction for scholarship in this area.
Relatedly, most work on media coverage of terrorism focuses on the U.S. so results
may not translate cross-nationally. Exploring terrorist attacks and media coverage
outside of the U.S. is another possibility for future research. Longitudinally examining
how media frame terrorism pre- and post-9/11 may also yield interesting findings. An
expanded dataset may also allow for examination of the interaction between identities,
which was not possible here since only one attack had a White, Muslim perpetrator.
Finally, lack of a public archive for websites like FoxNews.com and HuffingtonPost.com
precluded us from examining differences in how media frame violence more
comprehensively across the political spectrum. Future work could examine differences
here over a shorter time period, where data availability is not an issue.
There were also methodological limitations, the largest being that we necessarily
have to rely on publicly available information about perpetrators. There is unconfirmed
speculation about a history of mental illness for some perpetrators, and for others there
may be mental health issues that are currently unknown or unaddressed. Again, it is
important to reiterate that we did not see differences in the prevalence of known or
suspect mental health issues between either White and non-White or Muslim and nonMuslim perpetrators. Additionally, while white supremacists have perpetrated much of
the terrorism in the U.S. in recent years, the U.S. government has been reticent to label
these attacks as terrorism, which may in turn influence how media report on them.
Investigating this is beyond the scope of the current project. Lastly, our approach here
was to examine whether each article references terrorism or mental illness. This leaves
room for further, more in-depth qualitative and linguistic analyses of other ways that
news articles may differentially frame or depict terrorism. Focusing on mental illness as
a key driver of some attacks can downplay or discount the relative importance of other
aspects of the attack, such as access to firearms. One potential function of framing
some acts of violence as terrorism and attributing others to mental illness is that this
may provide a buffer between the perpetrator and their religious, ethnic, or racial groups
while explaining their violence away. While an in-depth analysis of this nature was
beyond the scope of the current data and project, we recognize that it presents an
important point of consideration for future study.
Policy Implications
The attacks under examination in this study were all classified as terrorism by experts
using rigorous coding criteria, and thus should be discussed as terrorism by media. We
see, however, that this is often not the case. While only 16% of the attacks had a
Muslim perpetrator, 77% of the articles that reference terrorism were about these
incidents. In contrast, references to mental illness were more proportional and linked to

the mental health of the perpetrator rather than the perpetrator’s race. Media framing
and coverage influences how the public perceives issues (McCombs, 2014; Scheuefele
& Tewksbury, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). By differentially framing attacks by
Muslims as terrorism, news media perpetuate misconceptions of terrorism and terrorist
threats, which are reflected in public opinion (D’Orazio & Salehyan, 2018; Huff &
Kertzer, 2018; Saleem & Anderson, 2013) and can influence policy preferences (Beale
et al., 2019; Matthes et al., 2019).
The US public’s fear of terrorism is largely misplaced and seems to be based more
in media depictions than reality. Prior research shows that Muslim-perpetrated attacks
receive more media coverage (Dixon & Williams, 2015; Kearns et al., 2019b; Mitnik et
al., 2020) and the present study finds that this coverage is also more likely to reference
terrorism. Results indicate that news media present an incomplete narrative of the
landscape of terror attacks. Misperceptions like these promote prejudice and reduce the
likelihood that security threats will be appropriately addressed.
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1.
We use the term reference rather than label to more accurately capture the ways in
which media cover attacks. Whereas label implies a direct statement that the incident is
terrorism or the perpetrator is a terrorist, reference accounts for scenarios like coverage
of Wade Michael Page’s attack on a Sikh temple in which the following is said about him
(and other far-right extremists): “They claim a moral high ground that is anything but
moral in justifying the murder of the innocent. They see terrorism as a heroic act
necessary to awaken a fallen society.” While neither Page nor the attack are directly
called a terrorist or terrorism, the quote clearly suggests that it was terrorism.
2.
Further detail on the GTD and coding independence can be found on the START
(2020) website. Inclusion decisions are “based on the totality of information about the
attack reported in a variety of media sources . . . Specifically, GTD researchers look
primarily at information about the perpetrator (GTD Codebook p. 43). . .the target/victim
(GTD Codebook p. 32). . .and where relevant, information about the tactics/weapons
used that might inform whether the inclusion criteria are satisfied (GTD Codebook p
.23)” (E. Miller, personal communication, July 28, 2020). Coding decisions are made by
a team of extensively trained researchers “based on information about the attack
reported in a variety of media sources. . .If there is conflicting or unclear information
about whether the inclusion criteria are satisfied, trained GTD researchers assess the
available information and make a determination on whether it is appropriate to include
the case in the database, but mark it as ‘doubt terrorism proper’ to document the
uncertainty (GTD Codebook p. 11)” (E. Miller, personal communication, July 28, 2020).
Attacks without information about motive are not included in the GTD. When there is
unclear or conflicting information about motive, the attack maybe included by marked as
“doubt terrorism proper.” Information about the motive “must be explicit and is based on
a preponderance of evidence, but the GTD researchers do not require an official
designation or use a legal threshold of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’” (E. Miller, personal
communication, July 28, 2020). Coding Notes from the 2017 Las Vegas shooting detail
how the GTD works through the coding process for challenging cases (Miller, 2018).
3.

Testing whether the media is primarily the shaper v. the reflector of public sentiment is
beyond the scope of the current research. However, literature suggests both can be
true, and that people are more likely to seek out media that corresponds with and
reinforces their existing views across a range of topics (e.g., Moeller & de Vreese,
2019).
4.
2015 was the most recent year for which data were available when we collected our
data. 2006 was the first year where the majority of Americans used the Internet to get
their news (Caumont, 2013). The news sources in our dataset come from both print and
online articles. Accordingly, we started our analyses in 2006. In years prior to 2005, we
should see fewer news articles overall since print was more common and is subject to
space constraints that online media is not.
5.
While we appreciate the importance of images in coverage (Barry, 1997; Tsang, 1984),
an analysis of the pictures included in media coverage is beyond the scope of the
current project. Our sample was not collected with visual analysis in mind and this level
of analysis would not be supported by the current sample of articles. Some of the
articles in our sample were PDFs with images while most were documents of text only
from LexisNexis. Video captions were not coded for the same reasons we refrained
from coding images. Text within captions for images was coded because image
captions were present in both PDFs and LexisNexis documents, though these represent
a tiny fraction of the coded text.
6.
Systematically studying broadcast news is beyond the scope of this project. Broadcast
media has a fixed amount of airtime, so we expect that even more of these attacks
would not receive any coverage. In this study, 26.5% of attacks are not covered. We
expect that focusing on broadcast media would bias results in favor of more sensational
events.
7.
As others note in examining media’s role in setting public discourse, the amount of
media coverage given to terrorist attacks suggest over-coverage of some attacks as a
function of perpetrator identity (Muslim or minorities) and other factors (Chermak &
Gruenewald, 2006; Kearns et al., 2019; Mitnik et al., 2020).
8.
At the coding level, we differentiated between “terrorism”—referring to acts—and
“terrorist”—referring to perpetrator(s). For analyses of media framing of the attack, we
combined these categories. As noted in Supplemental Appendix B, we exclude
references that state that it was not terrorism or that the perpetrator was not a terrorist
(or mentally ill).
9.
Articles covering jihadi attacks are substantially longer, on average, than articles
covering other terrorist attacks (Mitnick et al., 2020). As a robustness check, we created
proportion variables were the number of references to terrorism and to mental illness in

coverage were divided by the total number of words in that article
(M = 608.6, SD = 457.8, Mdn = 513, Range: 11–3901). Results were fundamentally
unchanged, which gives us confidence that variation in article length is not the driver of
our results.
10.
Context was considered when making final decisions on codes. Each article was
carefully read to ensure that terms were not counted if they did not reflect the intended
meaning of the keywords. For example, instances of “insane” and “crazy” when clearly
used to indicate quantity (e.g., “insane murder rate”) or that something was absurd (e.g.,
“the insanity of paying taxes”) were not included. Further, references that clarified that a
perpetrator had no known affiliation with a terror group or that they were competent to
stand trial were excluded (see Supplemental Appendix B). Codes were only counted if
they were being applied to the perpetrator or situation or if a crime was being used as a
direct comparison to the crime being discussed (e.g., “Not since the Boston terror attack
has the country seen a bombing like this” would count as a terrorism reference because
the audience is being invited to reference their knowledge of terrorism without explicitly
labeling the attack as such).
11.
We coded this variable in two ways: a strict coding where only perpetrators with
diagnosed mental health issues were coded as 1 = yes and a loose coding where
perpetrators with suspected mental health issues were also coded as 1 = yes. We also
coded those variables to both drop incidents where the perpetrator(s) were unknown
and where these incidents were default coded to 0 = no.
12.
While terrorism perpetrators can be both White and Muslim, in the present sample this
is only the case for one attack. Thus, exploring the interaction between these identities
here would be impossible based on a single case.
13.
As a series of robustness checks, we estimated models in a number of alternative ways:
(1) outcomes as a count of mentions; (2) outcomes as a proportion of mentions over the
total number of words in the article; (3) recoding perpetrator identity variables to
collapse Muslim and White perpetrators with unknown perpetrators to create two new
variables—PerpNotMuslim and PerpNotWhite—to ensure that our findings are not an
artifact of collapsing non-Muslim and non-White perpetrators with unknown
perpetrators; (4) excluding cases where the perpetrator is unknown; and (5) measuring
casualties instead of fatalities. Across all alternative models, the results reported in text
are fundamentally unchanged, which has given us additional confidence in the strength
of our findings.
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